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Abstract
In this note, we suggest a link between tariff protection and firms' incentives to engage in a
horizontal merger. We consider a Cournot oligopoly with equal, constant marginal costs
where firms have to decide on lobbying efforts prior to choosing output. These lobbying
efforts will determine whether a prohibitive tariff is introduced. We find that the possibility
of lobbying may enlarge the set of mergers that are profitable, even without cost reductions.
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Salant et al. (1983) ￿rst pointed out that, in the absence of reductions
in production costs, mergers are seldom pro￿table. In particular, given a
linear market demand, mergers are unpro￿table unless they involve at least
80% of the ￿rms in the industry. Faul￿-Oller (1997) generalized this result
considering a general demand function, and a number of articles have further
explored the issue of merger pro￿tability, typically considering the possibility
of mergers reducing ￿xed and/or marginal costs, which increases the scope
for merger pro￿tability. For instance, Davidson and Mukherjee (2007) is a
recent contribution in this literature.
In this note, we propose a model to analyze merger pro￿tability where
mergers bring about no cost reductions of any kind. In the model, ￿rms
may lobby the domestic government to introduce a prohibitive tari⁄. The
tari⁄ raises the cap on the domestic price, since domestic producers face
competition from foreign producers, which are willing to sell any amount
of the good at the world price. Mergers increase the pro￿tability of lobby-
ing: since the equilibrium price increases after the merger, the payo⁄ from
lobbying increases relative to the pre-merger situation. Foreseeing this, and
for particular realizations of the world price, ￿rms may have incentives to
merge, even if the number of ￿rms involved in the merger is low relative to
the industry total.
There are industry cases analyzed in the Economic History literature that
suggest a positive correlation between industry concentration and tari⁄ pro-
tection. Indeed, the late 19th and early 20th Century was characterized by a
turn towards protectionism and high concentration in many Western Euro-
pean industries. For instance, Webb (1980) points at a strong interrelation
between cartels and tari⁄s in the German steel industry of that period. In a
similar way, Mendi and Veszteg (2007) study the case of the late 19th Century
Spanish iron and steel industry to ￿nd a joint occurrence of concentration
and increasing tari⁄s, with active and successful lobbying by major produc-
ers. This paper provides a simple theoretical explanation for the relationship
between mergers and tari⁄ protection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model,
and Section 3 analyzes the conditions for merger pro￿tability and presents
the speci￿c example of a linear demand function. Section 4 summarizes the
main ￿ndings and concludes.
12 The model
All N ￿rms in the industry have access to the same technology, which allows
them to produce with constant marginal cost c. We restrict our attention to
symmetric equilibria, where ￿rms have equal shares in total sales. Given the
world price pW and the tari⁄ T, the inverse demand faced by ￿rms in the
industry is given by
p(Q;p










where Q is industry output, and ￿(Q) is a continuous, di⁄erentiable, and
non-increasing function. Therefore, the industry demand curve is horizontal








= pW + T and,
for Q > e Q, it is given by ￿(Q). We assume that the relationship between
lobbying e⁄orts L =
P
i li, where li is ￿rm i￿ s individual contribution to
lobbying, and the tari⁄ rate T is non-decreasing. In particular,
T =
￿
0 if L < L￿
pM ￿ pW if L ￿ L￿;
where pM is the monopoly price. Hence, the tari⁄ will be zero if lobbying
e⁄orts fall short of some speci￿c level, L￿. By contrast, if lobbying exceeds
this threshold, the outcome is a prohibitive tari⁄. This discontinuity greatly
simpli￿es the analysis below.
This model is used to analyze the pro￿tability of mergers that involve M
out of the N ￿rms in the industry. We consider three stages:
1. One of the M ￿rms involved in the merger proposes the rest of the
M ￿1 ￿rms involved to merge. These ￿rms accept or reject. After the
merger stage is over, there are N ￿ M + 1 active ￿rms if the merger is
successful, and N ￿rms if it is unsuccessful.
2. Active ￿rms after the merger stage choose, in a non-cooperative way,
how much lobbying e⁄ort to provide, li. Aggregate lobbying e⁄ort
determines tari⁄ protection T:
3. Given T, active ￿rms non-cooperatively choose output levels qi. Pro￿ts
are realized.
2Once the value of T is determined in the second stage, ￿rms simultane-
ously choose quantities in the third stage. This gives rise to pro￿ts ￿(p;K),
which is an individual ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts in a symmetric equilibrium with K active
￿rms, all of them with marginal cost c, and the maximum equilibrium price
is p. Clearly, ￿ is non-decreasing in p and decreasing in N.
In the second stage, ￿rms simultaneously choose the amount of resources
that they devote to lobbying, li, and L =
P
i li. Firm i￿ s choice of lobbying
e⁄ort li as a function of other ￿rms￿contributions
P













j6=i lj ￿ L￿
L￿ ￿
P
j6=i lj if ￿(pM;K) ￿ ￿(pW;K) ￿
P
j6=i lj < L￿
0 if
P
j6=i lj < ￿(pM;K) ￿ ￿(pW;K)
where ￿(p;K) is the previously de￿ned pro￿ts function. There may be equi-
libria where ￿rms free ride on other ￿rms￿lobbying e⁄orts. However, in this
paper we focus on equilibria that are symmetric in lobbying, since we are
interested in the conditions that make lobbying possible. There are equilib-
ria where all ￿rms contribute to the introduction of the prohibitive tari⁄, or
other equilibria where ￿rms free ride on other ￿rms￿lobbying e⁄orts. Also
depending on the threshold level L￿, there may be other equilibria where the
tari⁄ is zero.
We consider equilibria where lobbying costs are equally split among ￿rms
in the industry. Since the Nash equilibrium price decreases with the number
of ￿rms K, lobbying becomes more pro￿table the fewer the number of ￿rms.
Hence, the following lemma:
Lemma 1 There is a non-increasing relationship between the number of
￿rms in the industry and aggregate lobbying e⁄orts.
To see this, if K increases, both ￿(pM;K) and ￿(pW;K) decrease. How-
ever, ￿(pM;K) always decreases by at most as much as ￿(pW;K), because
the price cap is pM instead of pW. Thus, the di⁄erence ￿(pM;K)￿￿(pW;K)
either stays the same or decreases. Since this di⁄erence determines the range
of values of lobbying by ￿rms other than i that induce ￿rm i to choose a pos-
itive li, and the problem is symmetric, aggregate lobbying either decreases
or stays the same if the number of ￿rms increases.
This lemma implies that ￿rms￿incentives to engage in lobbying increase
after a merger. In some cases, this will induce ￿rms to successfully lobby
3after a merger even if there was no lobbying at all before the merger. Taking
this into account, merging ￿rms might be better o⁄ after the merger, thus
o⁄setting the reduction in pro￿tability pointed out in Salant et al (1983).
3 Merger pro￿tability
This section inspects under what circumstances a merger among M of the N
￿rms in the industry is pro￿table not only for outsiders, but also for merging
￿rms. We will focus on cases where M￿(pW;N) < (N ￿ M + 1)￿(pW;N ￿
M +1). In these cases, the merger among M ￿rms is unpro￿table, given the
world price. If this condition did not hold, the merger would be pro￿table
regardless of the tari⁄. In particular, Salant et al. (1983) consider the case
pW = pM, since they ignored the possibility of imports. In the cases that we
are considering, in order for the merger to be pro￿table, it will be necessary
that combined lobbying e⁄orts fall short of L￿ before the merger, while they
exceed this level once the merger takes place. Otherwise, we know that the






i.e. that the equilibrium tari⁄ before the merger be zero.
After the merger, it must be true that ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to contribute
to lobbying. Notice that prices increase after the merger, which ultimately
increases the pro￿tability of lobbying e⁄orts. Hence, in order for an equilib-
rium to exist where the prohibitive tari⁄ is introduced, it is necessary that
L￿
N ￿ M + 1
< ￿(p
M;N ￿ M + 1) ￿ ￿(p
W;N ￿ M + 1) (3)
This condition ensures that the equilibrium where all N￿M+1 ￿rms equally
split lobbying costs exists.
Finally, merging ￿rms must be better o⁄ after the merger, taking into
account that their contribution to lobbying was zero before the merger, and
is positive after the merger takes place. Hence, it must be true that:
M￿(p
W;N) < ￿(p
M;N ￿ M + 1) ￿
L￿
N ￿ M + 1
: (4)
Condition (2) imposes a lower bound on L￿, whereas (3) and (4) impose
upper bounds on L￿. Since we are considering the case where M￿(pW;N) >
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we can establish the following lemma:
Lemma 2 For a su¢ ciently low value of the world price pW, every merger
may be pro￿table, i.e. there exist values of L￿ such that the merger is prof-
itable.
Notice that as the world price approaches the marginal cost, the right-
most term in (5) converges to zero. When this is the case, the inequality
always holds, since the left-hand side becomes industry pro￿ts with N ￿rms,
whereas the right-hand side is industry pro￿ts with (N ￿ M + 1) ￿rms, and
industry pro￿ts are decreasing in the number of ￿rms. Thus, since ￿(pW;N)
is non-decreasing in pW, there is always an interval of values of the world
price such that the merger is pro￿table. This result also gives rise to the
following corollaries:
Corollary 3 Given N and M, the greater pW, the lower the probability of
the merger being pro￿table.
Here, what we mean by lower probability of pro￿table merger is the length
of the interval of values of L￿ that allow for condition (5) to hold. Notice that
the right-hand side of (5) decreases with pW, which implies that the interval
of values of L￿such that the merger is pro￿table is reduced.
Corollary 4 A merger to monopoly is always pro￿table, regardless of the
value of pW.
5Salant et al. (1983) constitutes a particular case of this model, where pW
is su¢ ciently high. If this is the case, then ￿(pW;N) = ￿(pM;N). Hence,
condition (5) may be rewritten as:
M￿(p
M;N) < ￿(p
M;N ￿ M + 1): (6)
Thus, the merger will not be pro￿table unless (6) holds. For these values
of pW, investing on lobbying is not pro￿table, since the world price is above
the domestic Nash equilibrium price. In other words, lobbying removes a
non-binding constraint and has no actual e⁄ect. Hence, the condition for
merger pro￿tability is the same as in Salant et al. (1983).
3.1 Example: linear demand
As a matter of illustration, this subsection analyzes the case of a linear de-
mand, where ￿(Q) = 1￿Q, and c = 0. With these parameter values, pM = 1
2.
If the world price is above this monopoly level, then a merger that involves
M of the N ￿rms in the industry is pro￿table if
M
(N + 1)2 ￿
1
(N ￿ M + 2)2
which implies that, for M ￿ 2,
(N + 1)
2 ￿ M (2(N + 1) ￿ (M ￿ 1)): (7)
However, if the world price is low enough, the merger may be pro￿table




(N + 1)2; ￿(p
W;N￿M+1) =
1




which allows us to write condition (6) as:
N
(N + 1)2 <
N ￿ M + 1




For instance, for a su¢ ciently high level of the world price, a bilateral
merger (M = 2) is not pro￿table if N = 4. However, there is always a value
of the world price that makes a bilateral merger pro￿table if N = 4. Notice
that if the world price is arbitrarily close to the marginal cost (zero) then
condition (7) reduces to 4
25 < 3
16. As the world price increases, the right-hand
side of (7) decreases, and for pW = 0:0584, the condition no longer holds.
For pW 2 [0;0:0584] it is possible to ￿nd values of L￿ that make the merger
pro￿table.
64 Conclusions
In this note, we propose a simple model where ￿rms in an industry may lobby
the domestic government to introduce a prohibitive tari⁄. This possibility
may make some mergers pro￿table, even if they involve a relatively small
number of ￿rms. The model allows us to conclude ￿rst that aggregate lobby-
ing decreases with the number of ￿rms in the industry. Furthermore, the pos-
sibility of lobbying provide ￿rms with additional incentives to merge. Also,
merger pro￿tability decreases with the world price. Therefore, as domestic
￿rms become more e¢ cient relative to foreign producers, their incentives to
merge and seek tari⁄protection are reduced. Finally, if the cost of lobbying is
either too high or too low, no merger will occur: if the domestic government
is either totally in￿ uenced or totally una⁄ected by lobbying, ￿rms will have
no incentive to merge for lobbying reasons. The incentive to merge appears
for intermediate minimum values of lobbying that induce the government to
introduce the prohibitive tari⁄.
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